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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, GTE Corporation ("GTE"), brought an action for infringement of a federally registered service mark against defendant, Williams. Williams was a sole proprietor who operated his business under
the name of "General Telephone" in Utah since 1974. Williams used
this name even though he knew of General Telephone and Electronics
of California. GTE subsidiaries, on the other hand, employed the same
name with geographical identifiers prior to 1974. Not until 1981
through 1982, however, did GTE apply for and receive registration of
the "General Telephone" service mark. The district court held that Williams could register the mark concurrently and have its exclusive use in
his region in Utah. The district court reasoned that "General Telephone" was descriptive as opposed to suggestive, and hence not entitled
to protection because it was not susceptible of a secondary meaning.
Further, it concluded that Williams' use of the name was not likely to
cause confusion, and Williams had established the statutory, "intermediate junior user" defense and the common law "good faith adoption"
defense. GTE subsequently appealed. The issues considered on appeal
were whether: (1) GTE established that Williams' use of the name
would cause confusion in the market place; (2) § 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a), was irrelevant; (3) Williams was an intermediate junior user thus entitled to the Tea Rose-Rectanus defense; and
(4) the good faith adoption in a remote region defense is applicable to
§ 43(a) when it is used as an alternative claim for infringement.
The Tenth Circuit first found that GTE was simply challenging the
credibility of Williams' testimony and the weight it gave other evidence
instead of market place confusion. The court concluded that there was
no error in the district court's factual findings. Second, the court found
that because GTE's registration was not "incontestable," it could not
conclude that § 33(b)(5) barred GTE's infringement claims. Third, Williams was an intermediate junior user because he used the name after
GTE's adoption but before GTE registered it. Thus, the Tea RoseRectanus defense applied. The defense provides that a senior user may
not prevent a remote good faith user, who employed the name in the
remote area first, from its use of the like name. Consequently, the court
concluded that Williams' mere knowledge of GTE's use of "General
Telephone" was insufficient to defeat a finding of good faith. The court
explained that to defeat this finding, Williams must have intended to
benefit from GTE's reputation or good will. Finally, the court ruled that
when § 43(a) is used as an alternative claim for infringement, the good
faith remote use defense is applicable.
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Kleier Advertising, Inc., v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036
Author: Judge Sam, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Kleier Advertising, Incorporated, ("Kleier"), alleged copyright infringement by defendants, Premier Pontiac, Incorporated, ("Premier"), and its advertiser, Stokely, through their use of a Kleier
billboard theme. Kleier also claimed defamation and deceptive trade
practices based on an article in a Tulsa paper. The district court granted
Premier and Stokely summary judgment on the defamation claim, and a
directed verdict on the deceptive trade practices claim. The jury found
for Kleier on the copyright claim, but granted only the license fee, not
lost profits. Kleier appealed the award amount, the denial of prejudgment interest, and the summary judgment and directed verdict.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award, the summary judgment and
the directed verdict, but it reversed the denial of prejudgment interest.
The court held that, though the jury could have awarded lost profits, it
chose not to, and that the court would not substitute its judgment for
thejury's. Second, the district court did not award prejudgment interest
because it adopted the view that prejudgment interest is not recoverable
under the Copyright Act. The court disagreed, however, holding that
recovery of prejudgment interest is discretionary, and that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to add prejudgment interest to the
verdict. There was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the newspaper article was libelous per se, and Kleier did not allege any special
damages. Summary judgment on the defamation claim was upheld.
The directed verdict on the deceptive trade practices was also upheld,
since Kleier presented no evidence that the newspaper article affected its
right to sell the billboard program in Tulsa.

